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Abstract
We present recent work on the development of Java PathExplorer (JPaX), a tool
for monitoring the execution of Java programs. JPaX can be used during program
testing to gain increased information about program executions, and can potentially
furthermore be applied during operation to survey safety critical systems. The tool
facilitates automated instrumentation of a program's byte code, which will then
emit events to an observer during its execution. The observer checks the events
against user provided high level requirement specications, for example temporal
logic formulae, and against lower level error detection procedures, usually concur-
rency related such as deadlock and data race algorithms. High level requirement
specications together with their underlying logics are dened in rewriting logic us-
ing Maude, and then can either be directly checked using Maude rewriting engine,
or be rst translated to eÆcient data structures and then checked in Java.
1 Introduction
Correctness of software is becoming an increasingly important issue in many
branches of our society. People's lives often depend on software systems even
though they tend to not be aware of it. The success of most technological ex-
periments, including space craft and rover technology within the space agen-
cies, heavily depends on the correctness of software. It is widely accepted that
future space crafts will become highly autonomous, taking decisions without
communication from ground, so the required software is becoming signicantly
more complex, increasing the risk of mission failures. Two common ways to
approach the delicate problem of software correctness is program synthesis,
which gives a high degree of condence but seems to work properly only on
very restricted domain-specic problems, and program verication, which is
concerned with detecting as many errors as possible in existing programs.
c
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Two important aspects of program verication are testing and the use of for-
mal methods. Traditional testing techniques, however, are very ad hoc and do
not allow for formal specication and verication of high level logical prop-
erties that a system needs to satisfy. On the other hand, traditional formal
methods such as model checking and theorem proving are usually very heavy
and rarely can be used in practice successfully without considerable manual
eort.
The Automated Software Engineering group at NASA Ames Research Cen-
ter has for some time investigated advanced formal methods for insuring soft-
ware correctness, in both areas of program synthesis [14,5,19] and program
verication [8,9,18,7,11]. Program synthesis is not discussed here, but it is
worth noticing that code and/or data structures synthesized from logical for-
mulae, such as nite state machines, Buchi automata or dynamic programming
algorithms, are often used in program verication. We have performed various
verication case studies using formal techniques, in particular model checking,
to analyze space craft software [8]. Two model checkers have furthermore been
developed, both supporting full state space exploration of Java programs us-
ing explicit state model checking techniques [9,18]. These techniques allow for
proving temporal logic properties on programs that have a few million states,
but fail to apply on large programs.
This paper is the fourth, after [10,16,11], in a series describing our eort in
runtime verication, which can be roughly dened as combining testing and
formal methods. Testing scales well, and is by far the most used technique
in practice to validate software systems. The merge of testing and temporal
logic specication is an attempt to achieve the benets of both approaches,
while avoiding some of the pitfalls of ad hoc testing and the complexity of
theorem proving and model checking. In this paper, we present the current
status of a new runtime verication system, called Java PathExplorer (JPaX),
for monitoring Java programs by analyzing (exploring) particular execution
traces. The general idea consists of extracting state events from an executing
program, and then analyzing them via a remote observer process. The observer
performs two kinds of verication, namely logic based monitoring and error
pattern analysis.
Logic based monitoring consists of checking formal requirement specica-
tions on the executing program, written in high level logics by users of the
system. Logics are currently implemented in Maude [2], a high-performance
system supporting both rewriting logic and membership equational logic. One
can very naturally and easily dene new logics in Maude, such as for example
temporal logics, together with their operational semantics. Currently, JPaX
supports two builtin logics, future time and past time linear temporal logics.
The implementation of both these logics in Maude together with an infras-
tructure module that handles atomic propositions that will most likely be part
of any other more general logic, covers less than 130 lines. Therefore, dening
new logics should be very feasible for advanced users. The current version of
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Maude can do up to 3 million rewritings per second on 800Mhz processors,
and its compiled version is intended to support 15 million rewritings per sec-
ond. Hence, we have decided to use Maude as the logical monitoring engine
that performs the conformance checks of events against specications at this
early stage of JPaX.
Error pattern analysis consists of analyzing one execution trace of events
using various error detection algorithms that can identify error-prone pro-
gramming practices, such as unhealthy locking disciplines that may lead to
data races and/or deadlocks. The important and appealing aspect of these al-
gorithms is that they nd error potentials even in the case where errors do not
explicitly occur in the examined execution trace. They are usually fast and
scalable, and often catch the problems they are designed to catch, that is, the
randomness in the choice of run does not seem to imply a similar randomness
in the analysis results. Two such known algorithms focusing on concurrency
errors have been implemented in JPaX, one for deadlocks and the other for
data races, but the system is designed in such a way that users can relatively
easily attach new such algorithms.
The idea of using temporal logic in program testing is not new, and at
our knowledge, has already been pursued in the commercial Temporal Rover
tool (TR) [4], and in the MaC tool [13]. TR allows the user to specify future
time temporal formulae as comments in programs, which are then translated
into appropriate Java code before the compilation. The MaC tool is closer
in spirit to what we describe in this paper, except that its specication lan-
guage is xed and very limited compared to the Maude language and doesn't
provide support for error pattern analysis. On the other hand, tools like Vi-
sual Threads [6,17] contain hardwired error pattern analysis algorithms and
therefore are impossible to change or extend by a user.
Since the programming languages of the monitored program and the ob-
server are not required to be the same, eventually the system should allow to
monitor programs composed of subprograms written in dierent programming
languages including also C++ and C. However, for simplicity the system de-
scribed in this paper will focus only on Java. A case study of 90,000 lines of
C++ code for a rover controller has been carried out, leading to the detection
of a deadlock with a minimal amount of eort. One of the main design goals
is to make the system as general and generic as possible, allowing to handle
multiple language systems and new verication rules to be dened, even den-
ing new specication logics using Maude. Our hope is to make JPaX a basis
for experiments rather than a xed system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of JPaX.
Section 3 describes the underlying logic formalisms for writing requirement
specications, while Section 4 describes some of the error detection algorithms
for debugging concurrent programs. Finally, Section 5 contains conclusions
and a description of future work.
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2 Overview of JPaX
JPaX can be regarded as consisting of three main modules: an instrumen-
tation module, an observer module, and an interconnection module that ties
them together through the observed event stream (see Figure 1). The instru-
mentation module performs a script-driven automated instrumentation of the
program to be observed. The instrumented program, when run, will emit rel-
evant events to the inter-connection module, which further transmits them to
the observation module. The observer may run on a dierent computer, in
which case the events are transmitted over a socket. Hence, the input to JPaX
consists of references to two entities: the Java program in byte code format to
be monitored (created using a standard Java compiler) and the specication
script dening the kinds of verication requested. The output is a (possibly
empty) set of warnings printed on a special screen.
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Fig. 1. Overview of JPaX
More specically, the specication script denes what (if any) kind of er-
ror pattern detection algorithms should be activated, and what (if any) kind
of logic based monitoring should be performed, and in that case what the re-
quirements are. For logic based monitoring, we have been inspired by the MaC
language framework [13] and have split the specication into an instrumen-
tation script and a verication script. The verication script identies the
high level requirement specications that events are to be checked against.
The propositions referred to in these specications are abstract boolean ags,
and do hence not refer directly to entities in the concrete program. The in-
strumentation script establishes this connection between the concrete boolean
program predicates and the abstract propositions. The advantage of this lay-
ered approach, as also stated in [13], is that the requirement specication can
be created without considering low level issues, and can even be created before
the construction of the program. Currently, the scripts are written in Java.
Thus, high level Java language constructs can be used to dene the boolean
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predicates to be observed.
The Java byte code instrumentation is performed using the powerful Jtrek
Java byte code engineering tool [3] from Compaq. Jtrek makes it possible
to easily read Java class les (byte code les), and traverse them as abstract
syntax trees while examining their contents, and insert new code. The inserted
code can access the contents of various runtime data structures, such as for
example the call-time stack, and will, when eventually executed, emit events
carrying this extracted information to the observer.
The observer receives the events and dispatches these to a set of observer
rules, each rule performing a particular analysis that has been requested in
the verication script. Generally, this modular rule based design allows a
user to easily dene new runtime verication procedures without interfering
with legacy code. Observer rules are written in Java, but can call programs
written in other languages, such as for example Maude. Maude plays a special
role in that high level requirement specications can be written in the Maude
rewriting logic. The Maude rewriting engine can then be used in two dierent
ways: as a monitoring engine during program execution, or as a translation
engine before execution. In the former case, execution events are submitted
to the Maude program, which in turn evaluates them against the requirement
specication. In the latter case, the specication is translated into a data
structure optimal for program monitoring, which is then sent back to Java,
and used within the Java program to check the events during execution.
JPaX is built on a generic environment, named PathExplorer (PaX), which
only consists of the interconnection module and the observer module. The goal
is to make it possible to monitor programs in other programming languages,
such as for example C and C++, by just providing a language specic instru-
mentation module. Such an experiment has been performed in collaboration
with Rich Washington, a member of the Robotics group at NASA Ames, on
a 90,000 line C++ application for controlling a rover. The experiment just
activated the deadlock detection rule, and located a deadlock potential in the
application that had not been discovered through testing.
3 Logic Based Monitoring
Logic based monitoring consists of checking execution events against a user-
provided requirement specication written in some logic, typically an assertion
logic with states as models, or a temporal logic with traces as models. JPaX
allows the user to dene such new logics in a exible manner using the Maude
algebraic specication language. Maude [2] is a modularized specication and
verication system that very eÆciently implements rewriting logic. A Maude
module consists of operator declarations, and equations relating terms over
the operators and universally quantied variables. Modules can be composed.
It is relatively widely accepted that rewriting logic acts like a universal logic,
in the sense that other logics, or more precisely their syntax and operational
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semantics, can be implemented in rewriting logic. JPaX currently provides
linear temporal logics, both future time and past time, as builtin logics. Notice
that multiple logics can be used in parallel, so each property can be expressed
in its most suitable language. Since the Maude implementations of the current
logics are quite compact, we include them below. The Maude notation will be
introduced \on the y" as we give the examples.
3.1 Propositional Calculus
We begin with the following module for propositional calculus, which is heavily
used in JPaX, since most logics are based on it. It implements an eÆcient
procedure due to Hsiang [12] to decide validity of propositions:
fmod PROP-CALC is ex FORMULA .
*** Constructors ***
op _/\_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [assoc comm] .
op _++_ : Formula Formula -> Formula [assoc comm] .
vars X Y Z : Formula . var As* : AtomState* .
eq true /\ X = X .
eq false /\ X = false .
eq false ++ X = X .
eq X ++ X = false .
eq X /\ X = X .
eq X /\ (Y ++ Z) = (X /\ Y) ++ (X /\ Z) .
*** Derived operators ***
op _\/_ : Formula Formula -> Formula .
op _->_ : Formula Formula -> Formula .
op _<->_ : Formula Formula -> Formula .
op !_ : Formula -> Formula .
eq X \/ Y = (X /\ Y) ++ X ++ Y .
eq ! X = true ++ X .
eq X -> Y = true ++ X ++ (X /\ Y) .
eq X <-> Y = true ++ X ++ Y .
*** Semantics
eq (X /\ Y){As*} = X{As*} /\ Y{As*} .
eq (X ++ Y){As*} = X{As*} ++ Y{As*}
endfm
The module FORMULA, which is extended (imported), denes the infrastruc-
ture for all the user-dened logics. This will be further described in subsequent
sections. For now it suÆces to say that it includes some designated basic sorts
(or types) such as Formula for syntactic formulae; FormulaDS for formula data
structures needed when more information than the formula itself should be
kept for the next transition as in the case of past time LTL; Atom for atoms, or
state variables, which in the state denote a boolean value; AtomState for such
assignments of boolean values to atoms, and AtomState* for such assignments
together with nal assignments, i.e., those that are followed by the end of a
trace, requiring a special evaluation as described in the sections on future time
and past time LTL (our semantics for the end of the execution trace is that of a
continuous process that doesn't change the state). The propositions that hold
in a certain program state are generated from the executing instrumented pro-
gram. Perhaps the most important operator provided by the module FORMULA
is an operation f g:FormulaDS AtomState -> FormulaDS which updates the
formula data structure when an (abstract) state change occurs during the ex-
ecution of the program. Notice that in the case of propositional calculus, this
update operation basically evaluates propositions in the new state (the last
two lines). The user is free to extend all these types and operations as in the
module above.
Operators are introduced after the op and ops (when more than one opera-
tor is introduced) symbols. Operators can be given attributes in square brack-
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ets, such as associativity and commutativity. Universally quantied variables
used in equations are introduced after the var and vars symbols. Finally,
equations are introduced after the eq symbol. The specication shows the
exible mix-x notation of Maude, using underscores to stay for arguments,
which allows us to dene the syntax of a logic in the most natural way.
3.2 Future Time LTL
The rst monitoring logic that we present, and which is built on propositional
logic, is a variant of Future Time LTL [15]. Future Time LTL is a logic with
execution traces as models, which makes it convenient for program monitoring.
LTL provides operators such as X (always X), X (eventually X), ÆX (next
X), andX[Y (X until Y ), and their composition with standard propositional
operators. Usually in formal methods literature, concerned with subjects such
as model checking and theorem proving, LTL models are innite traces. In
a testing context, however, traces are nite: sooner or later, the monitored
program will be stopped and so its execution trace. Hence the operational
semantics has to reect this. Future time LTL can be implemented eÆciently
more easily than we initially thought on top of propositional calculus:
fmod FT-LTL is ex PROP-CALC .
*** Syntax ***
op []_ : Formula -> Formula .
op <>_ : Formula -> Formula .
op o_ : Formula -> Formula .
op _U_ : Formula Formula -> Formula .
*** Semantics ***
vars X Y : Formula . var As : AtomState .
eq ([] X){As} = ([] X) /\ X{As} .
eq (<> X){As} = (<> X) \/ X{As} .
eq (o X){As} = X .
eq (X U Y){As} = Y{As} \/ (X{As} /\ (X U Y)) .
eq ([] X){As *} = X{As *} .
eq (<> X){As *} = X{As *} .
eq (o X){As *} = X{As *} .
eq (X U Y){As *} = Y{As *} .
endfm
The four LTL operators are added to those of the propositional calculus using
the symbols: [] (always), <> (eventually), o (next), and U (until). The
operational semantics of these operators is based on a formula transformation
idea, and is dened by 8 rules, divided into two groups, all rening the op-
erator f g:FormulaDS AtomState -> FormulaDS that comes from the FORMULA
module. Note that in the future time LTL case the formulae themselves are
used as data structures (Formula is a subsort of FormulaDS). This operator
denes how a formula is transformed by the occurrence of a state change (a
new state), and evaluated on the propositional leaves. The intuition behind
the f g operator can be elaborated as follows. Assume a formulae X we want
to hold on an execution trace of which the rst state is As. Then the equation
XfAsg = X', where X' is a formula resulting from applying the f g operator
to X (and As), carries the following intuition: \in order for X to hold on the
rest of the trace, given that the rst state in the trace is As, then X' must
hold on the trace following As". The rst set of rules describes this semantics
assuming that the state As is not the last state in the trace, while the last
four rules apply when the state As is the last in the trace. The term As *
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represents a state that is the last in the trace, and reects the intuition that
the nite trace can be regarded as an innite trace where the last state of the
nite trace is repeated innitely. The two rules for each operator implement
the following simple equivalences:
s _ t j= ' i t j= 'fsg
s _ end j= ' i 'fsg = true;
where s _ t is a trace formed by a state s followed by a nonempty trace t,
and s _ end is the trace consisting of s followed by the end of trace (the last
state in the nite trace). As an example, consider the formula [](X -> <>Y)
and a trace where the rst state As makes X true but Y false. In this case [](X
-> <>Y)fAsg = [](X -> <>Y) ^ <>Y (modulo propositional calculus rewriting).
This reects the fact that after the state change, <>Y now has to be true on
the remaining trace, in addition to the original always{formula. A proof of
correctness of this algorithm is given in [10]. Despite its overall exponential
complexity, this algorithm tends to be quite acceptable in practical situations.
We couldn't notice any signicant dierence in global concrete experiments
with JPaX between this simple 8 rule algorithm and an automata-based one
developed by Dimitra Giannakopoulou, that implements in 1,400 lines of Java
code a Buchi automata inspired algorithm adapted to nite trace LTL (see
Subsection 3.4).
Such a nite trace semantics for LTL used for program monitoring has,
however, some characteristics that may seem unnatural. At the end of the
execution trace, when the observed program terminates, the observer needs
to take a decision regarding the validity of the checked properties. Let us
consider again the formula [](p -> <>q). If each p was followed by at least
one q during the monitored execution, then, at some extent one could say
that the formula was satised; although one should be aware that this is not
a denite answer because the formula could have been very well violated in
the future if the program hadn't been stopped. If p was true and it was not
followed by a q, then one could say that the formula was violated, but it
may have been very well satised if the program had been left to continue
its execution. Furthermore, every p could have been followed by a q during
the execution, only to be violated for the last p, in which case we would
likely expect the program to be correct if we terminated it by force. There
are of course LTL properties that give the user absolute condence during
the monitoring. For example, a violation of a safety property reects a clear
misbehavior of the monitored program.
The lesson that we learned from experiments with LTL monitoring is
twofold. First, we learned that, unlike in model checking or theorem proving,
LTL formulae and especially their violation or satisfaction must be viewed
with extra information, such as for example statistics of how well a formula
has \performed" along the execution trace. Second, we developed a belief that
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LTL may not be the most appropriate formalism for logic based monitoring;
other more specic logics, such as real time LTL, interval logics, past time
LTL, or even undiscovered ones, could be of greater interest than pure LTL.
In the next subsection we describe an implementation of past time LTL in
Maude, a perhaps more natural logic for runtime monitoring.
3.3 Past Time LTL
Past time LTL is useful for especially safety properties. These properties are
very suitable for logic based monitoring because they only refer to the past,
and hence their value is always either true or false in any state along the trace,
and never to-be-determined as in future time LTL. The implementation of past
time LTL is, however, surprisingly slightly more tedious than the above imple-
mentation of future time LTL. It is also built on top of propositional calculus,
by adding the usual two past time operators, ~ for previous and S for since,
and then appropriate data structures and semantics. The implementation ap-
pears similar to the one used in [13] (according to private communication),
which also uses a version of past time logic. We here present the past time
logic module as is, and then give a step-wise explanation.
fmod PT-LTL is ex PROP-CALC .
*** Syntax ***
op ~_ : Formula -> Formula .
op _S_ : Formula Formula -> Formula .
*** Semantic Data structure ***
op ptLtl : Formula -> FormulaDS .
op atom : Atom Bool -> FormulaDS .
op prev : FormulaDS Bool -> FormulaDS .
op and : FormulaDS FormulaDS Bool -> FormulaDS .
op xor : FormulaDS FormulaDS Bool -> FormulaDS .
op since : FormulaDS FormulaDS Bool -> FormulaDS .
var A : Atom . var As : AtomState .
var B : Bool .
vars X Y : Formula .
vars D D' Dx Dx' Dy Dy' : FormulaDS .
eq [atom(A,B)] = B .
eq [prev(D,B)] = B .
eq [since(Dx,Dy,B)] = B .
eq [and(Dx,Dy,B)] = B .
eq [xor(Dx,Dy,B)] = B .
eq ptLtl(true){As} = true .
eq ptLtl(false){As} = false .
eq ptLtl(A){As} =
atom(A, (A{As} == true)) .
eq ptLtl(~ X){As} = false .
ceq ptLtl(X S Y){As} = since(Dx,Dy,[Dy])
if Dx := ptLtl(X){As} /\
Dy := ptLtl(Y){As} .
ceq ptLtl(X /\ Y){As} =
and(Dx,Dy,[Dx] and [Dy])
if Dx := ptLtl(X){As} /\
Dy := ptLtl(Y){As} .
ceq ptLtl(X ++ Y){As} =
xor(Dx,Dy,[Dx] xor [Dy])
if Dx := ptLtl(X){As} /\
Dy := ptLtl(Y){As} .
*** Semantics ***
eq atom(A,B){As} =
atom(A, (A{As} == true)) .
eq prev(D,B){As} = prev(D{As},[D]) .
ceq since(Dx,Dy,B){As} =
since(Dx',Dy',[Dy'] or B and [Dx])
if Dx' := Dx{As} /\
Dy' := Dy{As} .
ceq and(Dx,Dy,B){As} =
and(Dx',Dy',[Dx'] and [Dy'])
if Dx' := Dx{As} /\
Dy' := Dy{As} .
ceq xor(Dx,Dy,B){As} =
xor(Dx',Dy',[Dx'] xor [Dy'])
if Dx' := Dx{As} /\
Dy' := Dy{As} .
endfm
The module rst introduces the syntax of the logic, the previous{operator
and the since{operator. The next two sections of the module introduce the
semantic data structure needed for past time LTL formulae, and its semantics.
The data structure is represented by the sort FormulaDS, introduced in the
FORMULA module, and is needed to represent a formula during execution. This
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is in contrast to future time LTL, where a formula represented itself, and a
transformation caused by a state transition was performed by transforming the
formula into a new formula that had to hold on the rest of the trace. In past
time LTL this technique does not apply. Instead, for each formula a special
tree-like data structure is introduced, which keeps track of the boolean value
of all subformulae of the formula in the previous state. These values are used
to correctly evaluate the value of the entire formula in the next state. The
operation ptLtl initializes/creates the data structure representing a formula.
The constructors of the type FormulaDS correspond to the dierent kinds of
past time LTL operators: atom (for atomic propositions), and, xor, prev, and
since. Hence, for example, the formula ~ A (previous A) for some atomic
proposition A is represented by prev(atom(A,true),false) in the example case
that A is true in the current state, but was false in the previous state. Hence
the second boolean argument represents the current value of the formula, and
is returned by the [ ] operation. The ptLtl operation that creates the initial
data structures from formulae is dened through equations that also dene
the operation f g:FormulaDS AtomState -> FormulaDS on the initial atomic
state. Hence, this denes how the data structure of a formula is initialized.
Note that this operation now is applied to the data structure of a formula. The
equations for the three binary operators (since, and and xor) are dened using
conditional equations (ceq). Conditions are provided after the if keyword and
introduce new variables used in the equations.
3.4 EÆcient Observer Generation
Logic-based monitoring can add overhead to the normal execution of pro-
grams. Because of the high complexity of validity in many logics, it is very
easy to design and implement ineÆcient algorithms. We deliberately decided
that, at this early stage of JPaX, it is more important to concentrate our ef-
forts on nding and experimenting with more expressive and natural logics for
monitoring, rather than implementing very eÆcient algorithms for particular
logics which may soon turn out not to be the most appropriate ones. How-
ever, since LTL seems to be a good candidate logic, we started to investigate
eÆcient runtime formula verication algorithms for both future time and past
time LTL. More precisely, we are looking for algorithms that generate eÆcient
observers from formulae, i.e., (Java) code or data structures that \encode" the
formulae and can be executed or modied synchronously with the observed
program, returning an appropriate message when the formula is violated.
After experimenting with runtime verication algorithms for LTL [10,16,11],
each with its advantages and drawbacks, we realized that in order for one to
properly compare these, one needs to rst understand and establish criteria for
\good" runtime verication algorithms. Consider a xed logic. The following
is a list of priorities that currently inuence the choice of runtime algorithms
in JPaX :
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Forwards Design. Algorithms that visit the execution traces backwards in-
volve storing the trace and cannot throw exceptions or guide the program
when a formula is violated.
Runtime EÆciency. An algorithm that is exponential in the size of the
trace is unusable, while an algorithm that is exponential in the size of for-
mula is usable but better be avoided.
Initialization. The time required to generate code or data structures from
formulae cannot be ignored, but it is considered less important than the
previous criteria.
A trivial rewriting algorithm for future time LTL that blindly implements
the semantics is immediate (see also [10]), but it is exponential in the size of
the trace, so it is impractical. The simple and elegant procedure shown in
Subsection 3.2 and proved correct in [10] is worst-case exponential only in the
size of the formula but linear in the size of the trace. We found it quite good
in practice so far and the fact that it can be implemented in only a few lines
of Maude code makes it a very good choice at this incipient stage of JPaX.
Dynamic programming algorithms generated from future time LTL formulae
[16] run in time O(nm), where n is the size of the trace and m is the size of the
formula. Unfortunately, these algorithms visit the execution trace backwards
so they fail to satisfy the rst criterion. Fortunately, the same idea applies
to past time LTL and, by dualization, yields forwards algorithms of the same
complexity. Therefore, past time LTL is a very nicely computable logic for
monitoring. Besides that, the naturalness with which one expresses safety
requirements in it makes us believe that it is a better choice than future time
LTL.
However, we next very briey present some concepts that lead to a future
time nite-trace LTL formula-checking algorithm that is the best one of which
we are aware satisfying the criteria above. It visits the execution trace forwards
and its worst-case runtime complexity is O(nk), where n is the length of the
trace and k is the number of variables of the formula. The complete details
together with optimality proofs will appear elsewhere soon.
We rst introduce some data structures that will be needed to encode
a formula. Intuitively, a binary transition tree is a binary tree where the
nodes are atomic propositions, while the leaves are states or truth values. For
simplicity in writing, we make use of a C/Java-like operator ? : having
the typical intuition: a?t
1
: t
2
means \if a then t
1
else t
2
". For example, if
P = fa; b; cg is a set of \atomic propositions" and S = f1; 2; 3g is a set of
\states", then a?(b?1 : 2) : 1 and a?(c?2 : false) : (c?true : (b?3 : 1)) are all
well-formed hP ?Si-binary transition trees. We next give a compact formal
denition which can be skipped by the impatient reader. Let Bool be the
set ftrue; falseg and let us consider two sorts Prop and State that stay for
propositions and states, respectively.
Denition 3.1 Given sets P : Prop and S : State, respectively, then a hP ?Si-
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binary transition tree (or simply hP ?Si-BTT or even BTT) is a term of
sort BTT of the order-sorted free algebra T

(P; S [ Bool) over a signature 
consisting of the sorts Prop, State and BTT with State a subsort of BTT, and
the operation
1
( ? : ) :Prop  BTT  BTT ! BTT. If S is empty then
hP ?;i-BTT's are called P -binary decision trees (or simply P -BDT's or
BDT's; see [1]).
If size of a BTT becomes an important issue, than one can change this
denition to take advantage of repetitions of subtrees, thus obtaining directed
acyclic graphs instead of trees, like in the case of binary decision diagrams (see
for example [1]). However, the size of BTT's doesn't seem to be important
yet, in the sense that it doesn't aect any of the three criteria above.
Denition 3.2 A BTT nite state machine (or simply BTT FSM) con-
sists of sets P and S, together with a total function next that maps each
element in S into a hP ?Si-BTT. A BTT nite trace FSM is a BTT FSM
together with a total function end that maps each element in S into a P -BDT.
The function end decides whether a state is accepting or not when a trace
ends there. The notion of accepted \execution" trace should be next dened
but space doesn't allow us to go into more formal aspects. We only show how
the LTL formula (a ! b) can be encoded as a BTT nite trace FSM: in
this case P = fa; bg, S = f1; 2g, next(1) = a?(b?1 : 2) : 1, end(1) = a?(b?true :
false) : true, and next(2) = b?1 : 2, end(2) = b?true : false. The intuition for
this data structure is as follows. If the monitored program, say P, is in a state
which is not the end of the observed trace, then: if the observer is in state 1
then evaluate the atomic proposition a in the current state of P and if this is
true then evaluate b and if this is false then change the state of the observer
to 2; if the observer is in state 2 then evaluate only b and if this is true then
change the observer state to 1. If one decides to stop the monitoring of P,
then the end BDT's are evaluated similarly. Notice that false is returned when
an a occurred in the execution trace which was not followed by a b. The reader
may have already noticed that we payed special attention to the evaluation of
atomic propositions: they are evaluated only when needed. This is because
the evaluation process can be often long; for example, an atomic proposition
can test whether an array is sorted.
We have designed and implemented in Maude (in less than 200 lines of
code) a relatively easy and elegant procedure that generates an optimal BTT
nite trace FSM from any LTL formula. Despite its worst-case exponential
complexity, it is quite fast on typical formulae and it never needed more than
30 seconds (on a 400MHz laptop) to generate an optimal data structure; it
needed more than 1 second only on hand-crafted articial formulae. This
initialization time is spent only once, at the beginning of the monitoring. The
following are a few examples of optimal BTT nite trace nite state machines
1
Written in mix-x notation.
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generated by our current implementation:
Formula State next end
  a 1 1 a?true : false
(a _:a) 1 1 true
(a! b) 1 a?(b?1 : 2) : 1 a?(b?true : false) : true
2 b?1 : 2 b?true : false
a U (b U c) 1 c?true : (a?1 : (b?2 : false)) c?true : false
2 c?true : (b?2 : false) c?true : false
Notice that liveness properties do not really make sense in nite trace LTL
without statistical analysis. In particular, the formula   a is violated if
and only if a is false in the last observed state of the monitored program.
The formula (a _:a) is always true in nite trace LTL and our optimal
generator proved that.
4 Error Pattern Analysis
Logic based analysis of execution traces can reveal domain specic high level
errors, but it implies human intervention in designing the application require-
ments or/and their underlying logics. However, many errors are lower level
and are usually due to bad programming practice or lack of attention, and for-
tunately, an interesting portion of them can be revealed automatically. Even
if some of these error patterns could be specied using adequate requirements
formalisms and then enforced using the same logic-based approach as above,
we think that this procedure is too heavy for this kind of errors, and that
it is actually more appropriate to allow the users attach designated eÆcient
algorithms to JPaX. We have implemented the algorithms described below in
both Maude and Java, but the current JPaX uses the Java implementations.
Error pattern runtime analysis algorithms explore an execution trace and
detect error potentials. The important and appealing aspect of these algo-
rithms is that they nd error potentials even in the case where errors do not
explicitly occur in the examined execution trace. They are usually fast and
scalable, and often catch the problems they are designed to catch, that is,
the randomness in the choice of run does not seem to imply a similar ran-
domness in the analysis results. The trade o is that they have less coverage
than heavyweight formal methods and often suggest problems which, after
a careful semantical analysis, turn out not to be errors. Two examples of
such algorithms focusing on concurrency errors have been implemented in
JPaX: the Eraser [17] data race analysis algorithm and a deadlock analysis
algorithm based on analyzing lock cycles. Both these algorithms have been
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previously implemented by Compaq in the Visual Threads tool [6] to work for
C and C++. Inspired by the Visual Threads tool, we also previously imple-
mented the data race algorithm and a variant of the deadlock algorithm in
Java PathFinder [7], modifying the Java Virtual Machine described in [18].
Our contribution in error pattern analysis for JPaX is to make these algorithms
work for Java using byte code instrumentation, to integrate them with logic
based monitoring, and to allow advanced users to program new error pattern
analysis rules in a exible manner. The rest of this section shortly describes
the data race and deadlock detection algorithms.
4.1 Data Race Analysis
We briey describe here how easily data races can occur in concurrent pro-
gramming and how Eraser [17] has been implemented in JPaX to work on Java
programs. A data race occurs when two or more concurrent threads access a
shared variable, at least one access is a write, and the threads use no explicit
mechanism to prevent the accesses from being simultaneous. The Eraser algo-
rithm detects data races by studying a single execution trace of the monitored
program, trying to conclude whether there exist valid runs where data races
are possible. We illustrate the data race analysis with the following example.
1. class Value{
2. private int x = 1;
3.
4. public synchronized void add(Value v){x = x + v.get();}
5.
6. public int get(){return x;}
7. }
8.
9. class Task extends Thread{
10. Value v1; Value v2;
11.
12. public Task(Value v1,Value v2){
13. this.v1 = v1; this.v2 = v2;
14. this.start();
15. }
16.
17. public void run(){v1.add(v2);}
18. }
19.
20. class Main{
21. public static void main(String[] args){
22. Value v1 = new Value(); Value v2 = new Value();
23. new Task(v1,v2); new Task(v2,v1);
24. }
25. }
The class Value contains an integer variable x, a synchronized method
add that updates x by adding the content of another Value variable, and an
unsynchronized method get that simply returns the value of x. Task is a
thread class: its instances are started with the method start which executes
the user dened method run. Two such tasks are started in Main, on two
instances of the Value class, v1 and v2. When running JPaX with the Eraser
option switched on, a data race potential is found, reporting that the variable
x in class Value is accessed unprotected by the two threads in lines 4 and 6,
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respectively. The generated warning message gives a scenario under which a
data race might appear, summarizing the following. One Task thread can call
the add method on the object v1 with the parameter Value object v2, whose
content is thus read via the unsynchronized get method. The other thread can
simultaneously do the same thing, i.e., call the add method on v2. Therefore,
the content of v2 might be accessed simultaneously by the two threads. Two
data race warnings are actually emitted, since the the other task can perform
the same behavior with v1 and v2 interchanged.
Roughly, the algorithm works and is implemented in JPaX as follows. The
instrumented byte code of the monitored program emits to the observer appro-
priate events when variables are read or updated, and when locks are acquired
or released as a result of executing Java's synchronized statements or from
calling/returning from synchronized methods. The observer maintains two
data structures: a thread map that keeps track of all the locks owned by each
thread, and a variable map that associates with each (shared) variable the
intersection of the set of locks that has been commonly owned by all accessing
threads in the past. If this set ever becomes empty then a data race potential
exists. More precisely, when a variable is accessed for the rst time, the locks
owned by the accessing thread at that moment are stored in the variable's
variable set. Subsequent accesses by other threads causes the set to be rened
to its intersection with the locks owned by those threads. An extra state ma-
chine is also maintained for each variable to keep track of how many threads
have accessed the variable and how (read/write). This is used to reduce the
number of false warnings, such as situations in which variables are initialized
by a single thread without locks (which is safe) or several threads only read a
variable after it has been initialized (which is also safe).
Deadlock Detection
Deadlock potentials are hard to nd in general, but there are classical deadlock
situations which occur when multiple threads take locks in dierent order. For
example, a deadlock will arise if a thread acquires a lock and then, without
releasing it, acquires another lock, while another thread rst acquires the
second lock and then the rst one. One can simply create such a situation in
the previous Java example if one wrongly tries to repair the data race by also
dening the get method in line 6 as synchronized:
6. public synchronized int get(){return x;}
It is clear now that the data race algorithm will indeed not return a warning
anymore because the variable x can no longer be accessed simultaneously from
two threads. However, there is a deadlock potential now and JPaX detects
it. More exactly, when running JPaX on the modied program, a lock order
problem is found and an appropriate warning message is issued summarizing
the fact that two object instances of the Value class are taken in a dierent
order by the two Task threads. It also indicates the line numbers where the
threads may potentially deadlock: line 4 where the get method called from
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add may lock the second object. Notice that this deadlock doesn't need to
appear in the examined trace in order for this warning to be issued. In fact,
deadlock potentials might be reported in general even if those deadlocks will
never appear in any execution of the program. Any execution of the modied
program above will cause a warning to be issued.
The runtime deadlock analysis algorithm is also implemented in the ob-
server and it needs only a subset of the events generated for the data race
algorithm, namely those related to lock acquires and releases of locks that re-
sult from executing Java's synchronized statements or from calling/returning
from synchronized methods. Two data structures are maintained in the ob-
server: as in the data race algorithm a thread map keeps track of the locks
owned by each thread, while a second data structure, a lock graph, updates
a graph that accumulates as nodes all the locks taken by any thread during
an execution, the edges recording locking orders. In other words, an edge is
introduced from a lock to another each time when a thread that already owns
the rst lock acquires the other. If during the execution of the program this
graph becomes cyclic, then there is a deadlock potential related to lock order-
ing in the program. This simple algorithm can reveal more complex deadlock
potentials between more than two threads, as illustrated for example by the
classical dining philosopher's example.
5 Conclusions
We have presented JPaX, a runtime verication tool under development at
NASA Ames Research Center. JPaX provides an integrated environment
for instrumenting Java byte code to emit events during execution to an ob-
server, which performs two kinds of analysis: logic based monitoring, checking
events against high level requirements specications, and error pattern anal-
ysis, searching for low level programming errors. It has been shown how the
two kinds of verication can be combined by viewing them as rules within an
extensible set of rules. It has in particular been demonstrated how the Maude
rewriting logic can be used to dene new logics for runtime verication in
a very exible manner, and how the Maude inference engine can be used to
perform the monitoring itself. In the case where eÆciency is required, we have
shown that optimal data structures can be generated from future time and
past time LTL. Finally, two known error pattern detection algorithms, one for
data races and one for deadlocks, have been implemented to work on Java.
The project as described above mainly focuses on applying the tool during
testing of a software application. Hence, with this perspective the goal is to
smoothly combine testing and formal methods, while avoiding some of the
pitfalls from ad hoc testing and the complexity of full-blown theorem proving
and model checking. However, an at least equally interesting application of
runtime verication is to apply it during operation, and inuence the program
behavior when requirements are violated. Our future research will focus on
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this aspect. In general, integration in the overall NASA Ames automated
software engineering eort is highlighted, and here two crucial issues are: how
can testing be made more formal, and how can missions be made safer in the
face or errors occurring during ight that survived tests.
Of other future work can be mentioned that we will experiment with new
logics in Maude more appropriate to monitoring than LTL, such as interval and
real time logics and UML notations. The latter allows to check original designs
(via state charts and/or sequence diagrams) against "real" execution traces.
Future work on error pattern analysis will try to develop new algorithms for de-
tecting concurrency errors other than data races and deadlocks, and of course
to try to improve existing algorithms. We will also study completely new func-
tionalities of the system, such as guided execution via code instrumentation
to explore more of the possible interleavings of a non-deterministic concur-
rent program during testing. Dynamic program visualization is also a future
subject, where we regard a visualization package as just another rule in the
observer. A more user friendly interface, both graphical and functional, will
be provided, and nally the tool will be evaluated against NASA safety critical
applications.
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